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A common feature of exchange rate misalignments is that they produce a 
divergence between traded and non-traded goods sectors, which appears to 
pose a dilemma for policy makers. In this paper we develop a small open 
economy model which features traded and non-traded goods sectors with 
which to assess the extent to which monetary policy should respond to 
exchange rate misalignments. To do so we initially contrast the efficient 
outcome of the model with that under flexible prices and find that the flex-
price equilibrium exhibits an excessive exchange rate appreciation in the face of 
a positive UIP shock. By introducing sticky prices in both sectors we provide a 
role for policy in the face of UIP shocks. We then derive a quadratic 
approximation to welfare which comprises quadratic terms in the output gaps 
in both sectors as well as sectoral rates of inflation. These can be rewritten in 
terms of the usual aggregate variables, but only after including terms in relative 
sectoral prices and/or the terms of trade to capture the sectoral composition of 
aggregates. We derive optimal policy analytically before giving numerical 
examples of the optimal response to UIP shocks. Finally, we contrast the 
optimal policy with a number of alternative policy stances and assess the 
robustness of results to changes in model parameters. 
   
 
 
* Acknowledgement: We are grateful for financial support from the ESRC, Grant No.RES-156-25-003, but 
the views expressed here are entirely our own. Address for correspondence: Campbell Leith, Department of 
Economics, University of Glasgow, Adam Smith Building, Glasgow G12 8RT. E-mail 
c.b.leith@lbss.gla.ac.uk. 1O v e r v i e w
One of the major arguments in favour of ﬁxed exchange rate regimes or monetary
unions is that under ﬂoating rates exchange rate misalignments are frequent,
large and damaging to the economy (see Buiter and Grafe, 2003, for example).
In contrast, the New Open Economy Macroeconomics (NOEM) literature (see
Lane, 2001 for a survey) has mainly focused on technology, preference or cost-
push shocks. This is especially true when deriving fully optimal policy (see for
example Clarida et al (2001), Corsetti and Pesenti (2005)). Shocks to Uncov-
ered Interest Parity (UIP) or International Risk Sharing (IRS) have generally
been introduced to explain the exchange rate ﬂuctuations found in the data
(see for example Wang(2005), Bergin (2006), Kollmann(2002)) but in models in
which all ﬁrms produce traded output. However, one of the notable features of
economies that experience large misalignments is the divergence between traded
and non-traded sectors. For example, during the appreciation in Sterling be-
tween 1997 and 2002, declines in manufacturing output were accompanied by
strong growth in the service sector.1 This appears to accord with the stylised
facts on the impact of large misalignments: see Marston (1988) for example.
This suggests that any analysis of the welfare implications of misalignments
needs to consider a model which includes non-traded as well as traded goods. In
this paper we extend the model of a small open economy in Gali and Monacelli
(2005) (henceforth GM) to include a non-traded sector. We compare allocations
chosen by a benevolant social planner to the outcome of a market equilibrium
assuming ﬂexible prices. We compute the steady state subsidies that would be
required for the ﬂexible price equilibrium to reproduce the eﬃcient equilibrium.
In the eﬃcient allocation, IRS/UIP shocks have no impact on production in
either sector. However, under ﬂexible prices (and assuming constant subsidies),
an IRS/UIP shock that causes an appreciation will lead to a reduction in the
output of traded goods, but an increase in the output of non-traded goods,
consistent with the stylised facts, and this will generate welfare losses.
If we add nominal inertia into the model using Calvo contracts, then policy
has the opportunity to respond to these shocks. We compute, for the ﬁrst time,
a quadratic approximation to social welfare based on the utility of the represen-
tative agent in this economy.2 We show that this expression for welfare cannot
be expressed in quadratic terms of aggregate output and inﬂation alone. Either
welfare needs to include terms related to individual sectors, or it can proxy sec-
toral diﬀerences by including terms in relative sector prices and/or the terms
of trade. We analytically derive optimal policy responses to IRS/UIP shocks
under commitment. We then, in a series of numerical simulations, contrast this
1See Cobham (2006) for details of this episode and the lack of consensus in the policy
debate surrounding it.
2There have been papers examining optimal simple rules for such an economy either by
examining unconditional expectations of utility (see for example, Ortega and Rebei (2004))
or by looking at conditional expectations of utility using higher order solution methods (e.g.
Doyle et al (2006)). However, we believe we are the ﬁrst to analytically derive a quadratic
approximation to utility which enables us to formulate a linear-quadratic policy problem with
which to characterise the optimal policy response to shocks in a two-sector open economy.
2optimal commitment policy to discretionary policy and other possible policy
stances. In general monetary policy attempts to oﬀset these shocks, but cannot
do so completely for two reasons: they generate inﬂation, and they move con-
sumption in the two sectors in diﬀerent directions.3 To the extent that prices
are more sticky in the non-traded goods sectors this tends to reduce the desire to
oﬀset the shock. We examine how these costs vary with the proportion of non-
traded goods in total output, and the extent of home-bias in the consumption
of traded goods.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines most of the
model, including the household’s allocation problem. Section 3 computes the
social planner’s problem. Section 4 looks at price setting by monopolistically
competitive ﬁrms under ﬂexible prices, and computes the ﬂexible price equilib-
rium and the subsidies required to reproduce the eﬃcient allocation. Section 5
adds nominal inertia in the form of Calvo contracts, and Section 6 computes
a second order approximation to social welfare in the presence of nominal in-
ertia. Section 7 derives optimal policy under commitment for our two-sector
small open economy, and Section 8 evaluates the welfare beneﬁts of optimal and
alternative policies for a calibrated version of the model in the face of IRS/UIP
shocks. Section 9 concludes and suggests further areas for reseach.
2 The Model
2.1 Households
There are a continuum of households of size one and the representative house-






where C and N are a consumption aggregate and labour supply respectively.
There are three types of good: non-traded goods (subscript N), which are
consumed and produced in the home economy, and traded goods (subscript T)
which are then broken down into two sub-types depending on whether or not
they are produced at home or abroad. (Subscript T,H denotes goods trade-
able goods produced at home, while subscript T,F are traded goods produced
abroad). Preferences between traded and non-traded goods are given by,4
3If we allow taxes to be varied optimally along with monetary policy, the inﬂationary
eﬀects of IRS shocks can be eliminated, but the costs associated with diﬀerent movements in
output in each sector remain. To oﬀset the shock completely we would require an additional
tax instrument which aﬀected the two sectors diﬀerently.
4Imposing a unitary elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods makes our
model derivation tractable and does not aﬀect our basic argument. Additionally, Bergin (2006)








(1 − γ)(1−γ)γγ (2)






Optimisation implies the demand curves,


























(1 − α)1−ααα (8)





CT,H are tradeable goods produced at home, and CT,F are tradeable goods pro-
duced abroad. Since we are imagining our economy to be small any value of α
less than 1 implies a home-bias in preferences over tradeable goods. The intro-
duction of such a home-bias has often seen as being equivalent to introducing
an o n - t r a d e a b l e ss e c t o rt oaN O E Mm o d e lsince both break the assumption of
PPP.5 However, we choose to retain both for several reasons. Firstly, the pres-
ence of both non-traded goods and home-bias allows us to capture the observed
structure of production and key aspects of the international business cycle (see
Benigno and Theossien (2006) or Corsetti et al (2003)). Secondly, we shall
show that it is only in the presence of both non-traded goods and home-bias
that our welfare measure needs to discriminate between the two sectors. Fi-
nally, by retaining home bias our model reduces to that of GM in the absence
5See, for example, Bowman and Boyle (2003).
4of non-tradeables, which is a useful benchmark for assessing the contribution of
non-tradeables to the description of optimal policy.
We are interested in modelling the home country as a small open economy
unable to inﬂuence variables in the rest of the world. Therefore, the rest of
the world can either be viewed as being an economy similar in structure to
the domestic economy, but where the weight of home-country goods in their
imports is negligible (ie. α∗ =1 , as in GM), or as a continuum of economies
similar in structure to the home economy, but where each country is small
relative to the whole (see Gali and Monacelli (2006) or Leith and Wren-Lewis
(2006a)). Accordingly we take rest of the world variables as given and assume
PT,F = εP∗ = εP∗
N for simplicity. The demand curves within the tradeables





and the demand for tradeable goods produced at home,



















assuming a similar form of basket (aggregated across a continuum of identical
small countries).
2.2 Households’ Intertemporal Consumption and Labour
Supply Problems
The ﬁrst of the representative household’s intertemporal problems involves al-
locating consumption expenditure across time. For tractability assume that (1)









The budget constraint at time t is given by
PtCt + Et{Mt,t+1Dt+1} = Πt + Dt + WtNt + Tt (16)
5where Dt+1 is the nominal payoﬀ of the portfolio held at the end of period t, Π
is the representative household’s share of proﬁts in the imperfectly competitive
ﬁrms, W are wages, and T are lump sum taxes. Mt,t+1 is the stochastic discount
factor for one period ahead payoﬀs. We can then maximise utility subject to

















where Rt = 1
Et{Mt,t+1} is the gross return on a riskless one period bond paying
oﬀ a unit of domestic currency in t+1 . This is the familiar consumption Euler
equation which implies that consumers are attempting to smooth consumption
over time such that the marginal utility of consumption is equal across periods
(after allowing for tilting due to interest rates diﬀering from the households’
rate of time preference).
The other optimality condition is for labour supply
W = PCNϕ (19)
We assume that the representative household supplies labour to both non-traded
a n dt r a d e dg o o d sﬁrms, such that N = NT,H + NN , and the wage rate will be
the same in both sectors.
2.3 Price and Exchange Rate Identities










combining with the terms of trade yields,
PT = PT,HSα (22)













6where T ≡ PN
PT,H is the ratio of the prices of non-tradeable goods relative to
tradeable goods produced in the home country. If γ =1and there are no
non-tradeables then this reduces to the same expression in GM.











































2.4 International Risk Sharing




















} = EtMt,t+1 (29)
where ςt is an IRS/UIP shock. Taking expectations and log-linearising implies,
b εt − Etb εt+1 = b Ri
t − b Rt +( ρ − 1)b ςt (30)
where
b ςt = ρb ςt−1 + vt (31)
which makes it clear that this shock is equivalent to the form of UIP shock
considered in Kollmann (2005).
Assuming symmetric initial conditions (i.e. zero net foreign assets, struc-
turally similar economies and the ex ante expectation that policy regimes will
be similar across economies) and equating the ﬁrst order conditions (focs) for






















where zi is a constant which depends upon initial conditions. Loglinearising
and integrating over all countries yields,
b C = b C∗ + b Q +b ς (34)
7where b C∗ =
R 1
0
b Cidi is the average level of consumption in the domestic economies
trading partners.
2.5 Equilibrium
Equilibrium in the non-tradeables sector is straightforward,
YN = CN (35)
but in the tradeables sectors is more complex. Consider tradeable good j pro-















































































From the IRS condition we can replace the term in foreign consumption,






and using the deﬁnition of the real exchange rate, aggregate consumption and
the price indices this can be re-written as,
YT,H = SγαT1−γγC[(1 − α)+ας
−1
t ] (43)
8Using the deﬁnition of the real exchange rate, (24), IRS implies,
C = S1−γαTγ−1C∗ςt (44)
Combining the demands for traded and non-traded goods we obtain an expres-































Combining this with (43) gives us the combined IRS-resource constraint,
YT,H = γSC∗ςt[(1 − α)+ας
−1
t ] (47)
= γSC∗[(1 − α)ςt + α]
Alternatively we can combine (47) and (46) to eliminate the terms of trade from































(C∗)αςt[(1 − α)ςt + α]α−1
In the special case where there are no non-tradeables, γ =1 , this reduces to,
C = Y 1−α(C∗)αςt[(1 − α)ςt + α]α−1 (49)
which is the same expression as in GM.
2.6 Production
We assume that both traded and non-traded goods are produced using a linear
production technology,
YT,H = ATNT,H (50)
and,
YN = ANNN (51)
where we allow for sector speciﬁcd i ﬀerences in technology.
93 Social Planner’s Problem.





subject to the technologies, (50) and (51), the resouce constraint in the non-
traded goods sector,
YN = CN (53)
the deﬁnition of aggregate consumption,(2), and our combined IRS-resource
constraint (48).
To formulate this problem in a convenient form, take logs of (48),
lnC = cnst+(1−α)lnYT,H+(1−γ)(lnCN − lnCT)+lnς −(1−α)lnφ (54)
where φ =[ ( 1−α)ς +α] and cnst is a constant made up of model parameters.6
Combining this with the production function for home produced goods for trade
the deﬁnition of the aggregate consumption bundle, (2), we obtain,
lnC = cnst +( 1− α)γ(lnAT +l nNT,H)+( 1− γ)(lnAN +l nNN)
+γ lnς − (1 − α)γ lnφ (55)
which allows us to write the social planner’s problem as an unconstrained prob-
lem in NT,H and NN. The two focs this generates are,
(1 − α)γ(NT,H)−1 − (NT,H + NN)ϕ =0 (56)
and,
(1 − γ)(NN)−1 − (NT,H + NN)ϕ =0 (57)
Notice that because utility and the combined IRS/Resource constraint are log-
linear the IRS/UIP shock does not aﬀect the focs implemented by the social
planner. Combining these gives the optimal balance between resources devoted
to traded and non-traded goods production,
(1 − α)γNN =( 1− γ)NT,H (58)
When there is no home-bias in traded goods consumption, α =1no resources
will be devoted to traded goods production. While if there is no weight given
to non-traded goods in utility, γ =1 , then there are no resources devoted to
their production. This can be substituted into the ﬁrst foc to obtain the social
planner’s optimal value of NT,H,




6As substitutions are made the composition of this cnst term will change. However, we
shall see that this does not aﬀect the allocation of goods and services made by the social
planner.
10Which can be solved as,7
((1 − α)γ)1+ϕ(1 − αγ)−ϕ =( NT,H)1+ϕ (60)
This can then be used to obtain the measure of NN.Using the deﬁnition
of aggregate labour input, N = NT,H + NN, we can obtain the relationship








Which implies, using the focs,
N =( 1− αγ)1+ϕ (62)
which is invariant to shocks. Therefore we can see that the social planner would
not devote any extra labour to production in the face of productivity or IRS/UIP
shocks. Using the production functions, the deﬁnition of aggregate consumption
and the combined resource-IRS constraint we can then derive the eﬃcient value
of variables. However, the social planner’s response to shocks is most easily seen
by consider the eﬃcient deviation of a variable from its steady-state value.
From the optimality conditions for labour supply we can see that,
b Ne = b Ne
T,H = b Ne
N =0 (63)
where a hat denotes the log-linearised value of a variable. These in turn imply,
b Y e




T,H = aT (65)
The eﬃcient level of aggregate consumption is given by,
b Ce = γ(1 − α)aT +
α(2 − α)γ
1 − α
b φ +( 1− γ)aN (66)
and the consumption of traded goods,
b Ce




Therefore the social planner does not alter the labour input in response to
any shocks, but patterns of consumption do change in response to IRS/UIP
shocks. From a positive IRS/UIP shock, consumption of imported tradeable
goods increase without any corresponding increase in production or consumption
of goods produced at home.
7If γ =1this reduces to,(1−α)
1
1+ϕ = NT,H, which is the optimal labour supply found in
GM.
11Additionally, even although the social planner ignores the price mechanism in
making his allocation decisions, we can consider what the implied real exchange
r a t ew o u l db eg i v e nt h eI R S / U I Pc o n d i t i o n ,
b Ce = b Qe +b ς (68)
Using the deﬁnition of the eﬃcient level of consumption our eﬃcient real ex-
change rate is given by,
b Qe = γ(1 − α)aT − (1 − α(2 − α)γ)b ς +( 1− γ)aN (69)
Note that the coeﬃcient on the IRS/UIP shock is negative such that a positive
IRS/UIP shock implies an appreciation of the real exchange rate. Therefore,
even although the IRS/UIP shock implies an exchange rate misalignment the
social planner does not choose to implement a resource allocation which com-
pletely oﬀsets that misalignment. Essentially, the social planner implements an
allocation of resources which maximises the utility of the representative domes-
tic household and this involves the optimal exploitation of the IRS condition.
4 Flexible Price Equilibrium
The representative household supplies labour to a continuum of ﬁrms operating
with the trade and non-traded goods sectors, respectively. The aggregate labour
supply condition was given by,
W = PC(NN + NT,H)ϕ (70)
which given the demand curve facing a typical ﬁrm in each sector implies the















²−1 is the desired mark-up reﬂecting the market power possessed by ﬁrms
due to the existence of diﬀerentiated products and χT and χN are subsidies used
to ensure the model’s steady-state is eﬃcient (see below for their derivation).
Note that this implies relative prices will only diﬀer across the two sectors in
response to idiosyncratic technology shocks.















12We need to rewrite these focs in terms of NN and NT,H to facilitate comparison
with the optimality conditions of social planner. Essentially the constraints
faced by the social planner allow us to replace the aggregate consumption term
with terms in NN and NT,H.
The other element of the two focs that needs to be rewritten in terms of NN












w h e r ew ec a nr e p l a c et h et e r m so ft r a d ew i t ht h ec o n d i t i o n
YT,H = γSC∗[(1 − α)ςt + α] (76)



















These can then be used to rewrite the two focs in terms of NN and NT,H.
−ϕln(N) − ln(1 − χN) − ln(NN) − ln(
²
² − 1





lnφ − ln(1 − χT) − ln(NT,H) − ln(
²
² − 1
)+l n ( γ)=0 (80)
These can then be contrasted with the focs from the social planner’s problem
which are replicated here for convenience,
(1 − α)γ(NT,H)−1 − (NT,H + NN)ϕ =0 (81)
and,
(1 − γ)(NN)−1 − (NT,H + NN)ϕ =0 (82)
The optimal values of χT and χN are then the ones that ensure that these
two focs allocate the same levels of labour to production of the two types of








(Note that when there are no IRS/UIP shocks this reduces to ln(1 − χT)=
−ln( ²





13which simply oﬀsets the ineﬃciencies due to imperfect competition in the non-
tradeables sector.
The subsidy required to ensure the ﬂex price equilibrium is eﬃcient requires
the subsidy to vary with the IRS/UIP shock. However, in line with the literature




)+l n( 1− α) (85)
which will imply that the ﬂex price equilibrium is not eﬃcient. We shall explore
the nature of this ineﬃciency below.
This implies with these constant subsidies in place that the log-linearised











(ϕ(1 − γ)+( 1− αγ))α
(1 − α)(1 − αγ)(1 + ϕ)
b φ (87)
and aggregate employment is given by,
b Nf = −
αγ
(1 − αγ)(1 + ϕ)
b φ (88)
This implies the following levels of non-traded goods production/consumption,
b Y
f
N = aN + b N
f
N = b C
f
N (89)
and production of traded goods,
b Y
f
T,H = aT + b N
f
T,H (90)
The combined IRS-resource constraint and the deﬁnition of consumption can
be solved to yield,
b C
f
N = aN +
αγϕ





T =( 1− α)aT −
(ϕ(1 − γ)+( 1− αγ))α





We are now in a position to describe the ﬂe xp r i c er e s p o n s et oa nI R S / U I P
shock. Following a positive IRS/UIP shock, which implies an appreciation of the
exchange rate, imported traded goods are cheaper and home consumers substi-
tute away from domestically produced traded goods towards foreign-produced
goods. This reduces the price of home-produced traded goods. The reduced pro-
duction of home-produced good reduces the demand for labour, which pushes
down costs in the non-traded goods sector. This prompts non-traded goods
producers to cut their prices and produce more goods, implying increased con-
sumption of non-traded goods.
14We can contrast the ﬂex price equilibrium with the eﬃcient allocation that
would be chosen by the social planner,
b N
f
N − b Ne
N =
αγϕ




T,H − b Ne
T,H = −
(ϕ(1 − γ)+( 1− αγ))α




N − b Y e
N =
αγϕ
(1 − αγ)(1 + ϕ)
b φ = b C
f




T,H − b Y e
T,H = −
(ϕ(1 − γ)+( 1− αγ))α




T − b Ce
T = −
(ϕ(1 − γ)+( 1− αγ))α
(1 − αγ)(1 + ϕ)
b φ (97)
Combining the two expressions for consumption of tradeable and non-tradeable
goods with the deﬁnition of aggregate consumption yields,
b Cf − b Ce = −
αγ
(1 + ϕ)
b φ = b Qf − b Qe (98)
and we see that the net impact of relatively higher non-tradeables consumption
and lower tradeables consumption under ﬂexible prices relative to the eﬃcient
outcome is a relative decline in aggregate consumption and total employment.
Given the IRS/UIP condition this implies that there has been a relative appre-
ciation of the real exchange rate under ﬂexible price. The social planner simply
allows consumers to enjoy the extra consumption of foreign-produced traded
goods made available by the exchange rate appreciation under an IRS/UIP
shock. Under ﬂexible prices this is not a sustainable allocation as the shifts
in relative demands across goods this implies will induce price changes which
will then prompt production changes. This is what the social planner avoids
by ignoring the shock in deciding on domestic production levels. It is also in-
teresting to note that the extent of the excessive appreciation under ﬂexible
prices is lower as the degree of home bias (1 − α) increases and the proportion
of non-tradeables (1 − γ) increases. The intuition is that the IRS/UIP shock is
essentially a shock to tradeable goods, and the less consumers care about such
goods the less there is a price response to such shocks.
5S t i c k y P r i c e s
In this section we introduce sticky prices through the device of Calvo contracts
whereby ﬁrms are only able to change their prices after a random interval of
time. This implies that monetary policy can aﬀect real variables, such that it
may be able to move an economy closer to the eﬃcient equilibrium in the face
of IRS/UIP shocks. It also allows us to capture a key stylised fact which may
aﬀect the transmission of both IRS/UIP shocks and monetary policy through
15the economy - namely that non-traded goods prices are typically thought to be
sticky relative to prices in the traded goods sector.8 We examine the pricing
decisions in both sectors, before considering a second order approximation to
welfare in the presence of price stickiness in the next Section.
5.1 Non-Tradeable Goods Pricing
The production function is linear, so for ﬁrm j
YN(j)=ANNN(j) (99)
where aN =l n ( AN) is time varying and stochastic. While the demand curve



























where κN is an employment subsidy which can be used to eliminate the steady-
state distortion associated with monopolistic competition (assuming there is a





































Solving for the optimal reset price, which is common across all ﬁrms able to































8The section on calibration of the model discusses the emprical evidence in support of this
assumption.
16Leith and Wren-Lewis (2006) demonstrate that this implies a New Keynesian
Phillips curve for non-tradeables’ price inﬂation which is given by,
πN,t = βEtπN,t+1 (106)
+
(1 − θNβ)(1 − θN)
θN
(−at + wt − pN,t − v +l n ( µ))
where mc = −a+w−pN −v are the real log-linearised marginal costs of produc-
tion, and v = −ln(1−κN). Which can be rewritten using similar subsititutions
as in the derivation of the ﬂex price equilibrium conditions,
πN,t = βEtπN,t+1 +
(1 − θNβ)(1 − θN)
θN
(ϕ b Nt + b NN,t) (107)
or in gap form,
πN,t = βEtπN,t+1 + λN(ϕ b N
g





θN and b N
g
t = b Nt − b Ne
t = b Nt since b Ne
t =0 .
5.2 Tradeable Goods Pricing
There is a similar problem facing ﬁrms in the tradeable goods sector which
results in a NKPC of the form,
πT,H,t = βEtπT,H,t+1 (109)
+
(1 − θT,Hβ)(1 − θT,H)
θT,H
(−at + wt − pT,H,t − vt +l n ( µ))
where1 − θT,H is the proportion of ﬁrms changing their price within a given
period, mc = −a + w − pT,H − v are the real log-linearised marginal costs of
production, and v = −ln(1 − κT). This can be rewritten (using the ﬂex price
focs) as,
πT,H,t = βEtπT,H,t+1 +
(1 − θT,Hβ)(1 − θT,H)
θT,H
(ϕ b Nt + αb ςt + b NT,H,t) (110)
or in (eﬃciency) gap form,
πT,H,t = βEtπT,H,t+1 + λT(ϕ b N
g
t + b N
g




6W e l f a r e









17Appendix I then derives a second order approximation to the representative

























1−αγ. Here it is the case that welfare depends not only on the to-
tal labour input, but on its composition between non-traded and traded goods
production as well as inﬂa t i o ni ne a c hs e c t o r .T h ei n u t i t i o ni ss i m p l e .W e l f a r e
depends upon the costs of producing goods in either sector. These costs are
captured by the output gap within each sector as well as the terms in inﬂation
which reﬂect price dispersion within each sector. Any price dispersion will in-
crease the costs of producing a given level of output. Therefore IRS/UIP shocks
and producitivity shocks when prices are sticky aﬀect traded and non-traded
goods diﬀerently and will require us to examine the composition of output.
Here we can discern the relative contribution to home bias in preferences and
the presence of non-tradeables in generating this sectoral version of the quadratic
welfare function. With no non-traded goods then that sector is, obviously, not
present in the welfare function, while in the case of no home bias (α =1 ), we
















With no home-bias in tradeable goods consumption, the share of domestically
produced traded goods in the consumer’s basket of tradeable goods would be
so small (given our small open economy assumption) that the production of
tradeable goods would be negligible. Therefore we need both non-traded goods
and a home-bias in traded goods to ensure that both sectors remain in our
welfare measure.
6.1 Relating Welfare to Aggregate Variables
Our welfare criterion reﬂects the costs of ﬂuctuations in our two sectors. It
diﬀers from the criteria typically employed by central banks in that such criteria
would usually focus on aggregate variables such as a single measure of price
inﬂation (e.g. output price or consumer price inﬂation) and a single measure
of output disequilibrium (the output gap). It is obvious that if we remove non-
tradeable goods from our economy then our welfare measure would reduce to
the combination of quadratic terms in output price inﬂation and the output
gap, conﬁrming the result of Clarida et al (2001) that the policy problem facing
policy makers in the small open economy is isomorphic to that in the closed
economy.
18An obvious question to ask is whether or not our welfare measure in the
presence of non-tradeables can be similarly reduced to terms in aggregate vari-
ables? To answer this question it is helpful to consider the relationships we have





T,H = b Sg (114)
The relative demand between the two sectors,









The deﬁnition of aggregate consumption,
b Cg = γ b C
g
T +( 1− γ)b C
g
N (116)
The combined resource-IRS constraint, (55),
b Cg =( 1− α)γb Y
g
T,H +( 1− γ)b Y
g
N (117)
The relationship between the output and consumption of non-tradeable goods,
b Y
g
N = b C
g
N (118)
These can be utilised to eliminate the terms in the sectoral output gaps,
but two variables will always be required to capture these terms. Suppose we
construct an aggregate measure of the output gap which is a weighted average
of the sectoral outputs,
b Y g =( 1− Ψ)b Y
g
T,H + Ψb Y
g
N (119)
such a measure would always need to be augmented with another gap variable,
such as consumption, the relative price term or the terms of trade. Two variables
are required to capture the composition of output across the two sectors which is
otherwise potentially masked in the single output gap measure. For example we
could rewrite terms in the individual output gaps as expressions in the aggregate
output gap and the relative price term,
b Y
g
T,H = b Y g + Ψb Tg,a n db Y
g
N = b Y g − (1 − Ψ)b Tg
or aggregate output and the terms of trade,
b Y
g





(b Y g − (1 − Ψ)b Sg)
Therefore, we can see that introducing non-tradeable goods to the open economy
model provides a rationale for including quadratic terms in the terms of trade
or real exchange rate gaps in the welfare measure9.
9Kirsanova et al (2006) provide further reasons for including such terms in a model without
a non-tradeables sector.
19A similar reasoning applies to the inﬂation terms. Since we care about the
dispersion of prices within each sector it is not possible to consider a single
aggregate measure of inﬂation which aggregates inﬂation across the two sec-
tors since this may mask and divergence in inﬂation between the two sectors.
However from the deﬁnition of the relative price term, b T we know,
∆b Tt = πN,t − πT,H,t (120)
From our model we have a deﬁnition of consumer price inﬂation,
πt = γπT,t +( 1− γ)πN,t (121)
= γ((1 − α)πT,H,t + απT,F,t)+( 1− γ)πN,t
If we exclude the element of foreign price inﬂation in formulating an inﬂation
measure for the monetary policy maker then we obtain,
πcb
t = γ(1 − α)πT,H,t +( 1− γ)πN,t (122)
=( 1 − αγ)(((1 − Ψ)πT,H,t + ΨπN,t)
which is an output price measure based on a weighted average of inﬂation in
our tradeables and non-tradeables sectors. Clearly we can rewrite our terms
in inﬂation using a combination of this aggregate measure in conjunction with
∆T. It is important to note that this version of T is not in a gapped form and
that the relationship between this and the gapped version is given by,
b Tt = b T
g
t − aT,t + aN,t − αb ςt (123)
Using the various price and exchange rate identities this term can then be
rewritten using a combination of changes in the real exchange rate and terms
of trade from,
∆b Qt =( 1− γ)∆b Tt +( 1− γα)∆b St (124)
Therefore, by introducing non-tradeable alongside tradeable goods we create
a two sector economy where it is not possible to capture the extent of price
dispersion in the economy using a single inﬂation measure alone. Instead any
aggregate inﬂation measure must be augmented with terms in changes in relative
prices to reﬂect diﬀerences in the rates of inﬂation across the two sectors. This,
therefore, provides a rationalisation for including terms in the change in actual
exchange rates (or related variables) rather than simply the gapped values of
such variables.
It could be argued that these results are not surprising, in the sense that
by modelling the sectoral composition of the economy and introducing a shock
which changes patterns of production across these sectors in a distortionary way
is bound not to be captured by the simple closed economy welfare metric based
on terms in aggregate output and inﬂation. However, what our results also show
is that we can still formulate a welfare function based on aggregate variables by
introducing terms in relative prices, such as the real exchange rate, which allow
us to capture the sectoral composition of the standard aggregate variables.
207P o l i c y P r o b l e m
In this section we utilise our welfare measure to derive fully optimal policy under
commitment. Our objective function has been derived as (113), and our model
consists of our two NKPCs, (108) and (111), and the evolution of their relative
prices,
b Tt = b Tt−1 + πN,t − πT,H,t (125)
However, we need to relate this relative price term to output gap variables.
Appendix 2 derives this link as,
b T = b Y
g
T,H − b Y
g
N + αb ς + aT − aN (126)
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Note that when λT = λN these combine to yield the simple target crtierion,
Ψ²πN,t +( 1− Ψ)²πT,H,t + Ψ∆b Y
g
N,t +( 1− Ψ)∆b Y
g
T,H,t =0 (134)
Therefore with equally sticky prices in both sectors we obtain a target crtierion
which is similar to that found in a simple one-sector New Keynesian model (see
for example Woodford (2003), chapter 7) which exhibits the property of price
level control within each sector. In other words, in order to improve the trade-
oﬀ between inﬂation and output stabilisation the policy maker will commit to
return the price level in each sector to its pre-shock level.
R e t u r n i n gt ot h ec a s ew i t hd i ﬀering degrees of stickiness across sectors we































































































Ψ²(λTπN,t + ∆πN,t − βEt∆πN,t+1)
+(1 − Ψ)²(λNπT,H,t + ∆πT,H,t− βEt∆πT,H,t+1) (140)
+Ψ(∆2b Y
g
N,t − βEt∆2b Y
g
N,t+1)+( 1− Ψ)(∆2b Y
g




22We therefore get a backward and forward mix of dynamics incorporating the
desire make policy history dependent as well as take account of the fact that
policy in this period will aﬀect the relative price of non-tradeables and tradeables
in the following period.
8 Simulations
In this section we simulate the model in the face of IRS/UIP shocks. Our central
parameter set is given by, β =0 .99, θ
T = θ
N =0 .75, ϕ =1 , γ =0 .55,² =
6 and α =0 .28. The bulk of these parameters come from Leith and Wren-
Lewis(2006), but the shares of tradables and non-tradeables in consumption
baskets are taken from Theossein and Benigno (2006). Our IRS/UIP shock
follows an autoregressive process with persistence of 0.5 and an innovation with
a standard deviation of 6.6,
b ςt = ρb ςt−1 + νt (141)
where νt ∼ N(0,6.6). This ensures that our shock matches the UIP shock in the
form of equation (30) estimated by Kollmann (2005) using post-Bretton Woods
data.
The paths for our variables under optimal discretion and commitment policy
in the face of a 1 standard deviation IRS/UIP shock is given in Figure 1. Policy
acts to reduce the excessive real appreciation that would emerge under ﬂexible
prices, however it does not do so completely (the consumption gap remains
negative) as to do so would fuel inﬂation and exacerbate the sectoral diﬀerences
in consumption. The welfare costs of this amount to 0.0071% and 0.0079%
of one period’s steady-state consumption under commitment and discretion,
respectively.
Given the debate within the policy making circles as to the appropriate
response to exchange rate misalignments (see Cobham, 2006) it is informative to
contrast the optimal policy with alternative policies. Since the model would be
indeterminate under a policy which ignored the shock and simply ﬁxed nominal
interest rates, we need to consider other policy stances. Here we examine three
alternative policies, (1) ﬁxed real interest rates, (2)constant real exchange rate
and (3) strict output price inﬂation targeting.10 Under the ﬁrst policy there is
no attempt to oﬀset the misalignment of the real exchange rate, while under
the second there is a complete oﬀset of the impact of the IRS/UIP shock on
the real exchange rate. The third is a rigid application of domestic inﬂation
targeting. This range of policies should help us in assessing the extent to which
the optimal policy, does or does not respond to the IRS/UIP shock.
10An obvious alternative to consider is consumer price inﬂation targetting. However, Leith
and Wren-Lewis (2006b) demonstrate that although the cpi inﬂation measure reﬂects move-
ments in the exchange rate, targetting this measure of inﬂation is clearly damaging to welfare.
238.1 Fixed Real Interest Rates
The policy of ﬁxed real interest rates can be thought of as a simple interest rate
rule relating real interest rates to some measure of inﬂation,
b rt = δπt
but where the coeﬃcient δ → 0, such that the rule satisﬁes the Taylor principle
to ensure determinacy, but the response of real interest rates to inﬂation is
negligible. Since the log-linearised consumption Euler equation is given by,
b Ct = Et b Ct+1 − b rt
this policy implies that aggregate consumption does not deviate from its steady-
state value. The results of such a policy stance are given in Figure 2. Essentially
we do not get the fall in real interest rates that would occur under the optimal
policy, and the exchange rate appreciates by more than is desirable. This drives
down domestic inﬂation and output in both sectors. In contrast to the optimal
policy the welfare costs of the shock rise from 0.0071% to 0.2057% of one pe-
riod’s steady-state consumption. It is clearly sub-optimal not to respond to the
IRS/UIP shock.
8.2 Fixed Real Exchange Rate
In order to avoid any movement in the real exchange rate in the face of a
positive IRS/UIP shock it is necessary to implement a sustained fall in real
interest rates. The outcome of such a policy is detailed in Figure 3. Here
we see that this amounts to a signiﬁcant relaxation of monetary policy which
boosts consumption, output price inﬂation and output. The welfare costs of
such a policy are very large, with the discounted costs of the policy amounting
to 2.4843% of one period’s steady-state consumption. Therefore while it is not
optimal to ignore the shock, it is also clearly sub-optimal to attempt to eliminate
the shock’s impact on the real exchange rate completely.
8 . 3 S t r i c tO u t p u tP r i c eI n ﬂation Targeting
We now consider a policy which seeks to ensure that
ΨλTπN,t +( 1− Ψ)λNπT,H,t =0
which since we have equal degrees of price stickiness across the two sectors
in our benchmark case, implies πN,t = πT,H,t =0 .H e r e w e ﬁnd (see Figure
4) that interest rates fall, but not quite as much as under the optimal policy.
However, the welfare implications of this are not very drastic with the costs of
the shock rising from 0.007114% to 0.008135% under commitment, reﬂecting
the importance of minimising price dispersion under the optimal policy.
248.4 Robustness
In this subsection we explore a number of robustness checks on our basic results.
Firstly, in line with the empirical evidence, we assume that tradeable goods
prices are more ﬂexible than non-tradables prices and reduce the average contact
life in the tradeables goods sector from 1 year to 7.5 months (θT =0 .6).11 As
we reduce the stickiness of tradeables goods prices (see Figure 5) we start to
get diﬀerent rates of inﬂation in the two sectors. However, a given relaxation of
policy to oﬀset the appreciation will tend to raise the relative price of traded to
non-traded goods when non-traded goods prices are relatively sticky. This will
tend to exacerbate the sectoral imbalances implied by the IRS/UIP shock. In
other words the optimal monetary policy reacts less to the excessive appreciation
of the real exchange rate when non-tradeables are relatively more sticky than
tradeables. This reduced ability to oﬀset the shock results in a slight increase in
the welfare costs of the shock with costs under commitment rising from 0.0071%
to 0.0076%, and under discretion from 0.0079% to 0.0081%. In constrast the
asymmetries in inertia across the two sectors has a negligible impact on the
policy of strict output price inﬂation targetting, which remains as 0.0081%.
This reﬂects the fact that the policy of strict output price inﬂation targetting
was already shown to involve a slight moderation of the policy response to the
shock, which is appropriate when non-traded goods prices are relatively sticky.
In Figure 6 we plot the welfare costs of optimal discretionary and commit-
ment policy, as well as the policy of strict output inﬂation targetting, against
the proportion of non-tradeables goods in the consumption basket. As the pro-
portion approaches one the welfare costs of IRS/UIP shocks are eliminated,
since we essentially move to a closed economy special case. For discretionary
policy and strict output price inﬂation targetting the welfare costs are close to
being a monotonically decreasing function of the proportion of non-tradeables.
However, for commitment policy there is a more obvious non-zero proportion of
non-tradeable goods for which the welfare costs of the shock are higher.
In Figure 7 we undertake the same exercise, but considering variation in the
extent of home bias. As with non-tradeable goods when the extent of home bias
is 100% our model essentially reduces to a closed economy model and IRS/UIP
shocks have no welfare consequences. While with no home-bias we have already
noted that the share of traded-goods in domestic production are insigniﬁcant
such that the IRS/UIP shock would have no impact on domestic production.
Accordingly, as we increase the extent of home bias there is initially a sharp
increase in the welfare costs of the shock under all policies, prior to there being
a sharp decline. The reason is that initially the introduction of some home bias
means that domestic production now has a sectoral dimension which inhibits
t h ep o l i c yr e s p o n s et ot h es h o c k .
11Cristadoro et al (2005), de Walque et al (2006) and Ortega and Rebei (2004) all ﬁnd
non-traded goods prices to be relatively more sticky than traded-goods prices. Our ﬁgure of
θT =0 .75 and θN =0 .6 is consistent with the estimates of de Walque et al (2006).
259C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have outlined a model of a small open economy with both traded
and non-traded goods production, where both goods are sold in imperfectly
competitive markets. The representative consumer maximises consumption and
leisure over their inﬁnite lifetime, and chooses among diﬀerent types of good
with some bias in favour of domestically produced traded goods. We assume
than International Risk Sharing (IRS) holds, but is stochastic, and we focus on
the impact of these shocks.
We show that the benevolant social planner will choose an allocation where
production in each sector is constant, and independent of IRS/UIP shocks.
However, the market equilibrium under ﬂexible prices will not be independent
of such shocks: a shock that generates a real appreciation will be associated
with a reduction in the output of traded goods, but an increase in the output of
non-traded goods, and this will generate welfare losses. This accords with the
stylised facts on the impact of large misalignments.
By introducing sticky prices in both sectors we allow policy a potential role
in oﬀsetting such shocks. We show that a quadratic approximation to social
welfare based on the utility of the representative agent in this sticky-price econ-
omy depends on output gaps and inﬂation in both sectors. This expression for
welfare cannot be expressed in terms of aggregate output and inﬂation alone,
but sectoral diﬀerences in output gaps can be replaced by gap terms in relative
sector prices and/or the terms of trade/real exchange rate, and diﬀerences in
inﬂation rates can be replaced by terms in the actual change in relative prices
and the terms of trade/real exchange rate. Thus, the existence of non-traded
goods can be seen as one justiﬁcation for a concern by policy makers about both
real exchange rate gaps, and changes in the exchange rate (or related measures).
We then derive optimal policy under commitment for our two sector econ-
omy. When the degree of price stickiness across the two economies is the same
we get a target criterion for optimal policy which is similar to that in the closed
economy- policy makers seek to return the price level in both sectors back to
base following a shock. When we allow for diﬀering degrees of price stickiness
across the two sectors optimal policy becomes more forward looking as it must
also assess the extent to which policy aﬀects the evolution of relative prices
between the two sectors. Using a calibrated version of our model, we contrast
the optimal policy responses to IRS/UIP shocks under both commitment and
discretion, as well as other descriptions of policy.
When prices are sticky, an IRS/UIP shock not only generates the changes in
sectoral output noted above, but also generates inﬂation. Policy acts to reduce
the excessive real appreciation that would emerge under ﬂexible prices, but it
does not do so completely (the consumption gap remains negative) as to do so
would fuel inﬂation. As a result, monetary policy cannot completely oﬀset these
shocks for two reasons: they generate inﬂation, and they move consumption in
the two sectors in diﬀerent directions. This latter eﬀect is exacerbated when
non-traded goods prices are stickier than traded-goods prices. By implication, a
policy that attempted to hold the terms of trade or real exchange rate constant
26would be signiﬁcantly suboptimal, as is a policy which does not attempt to oﬀset
the shock at all. However, a policy of strict output inﬂation targeting is not too
damaging. We also examined how these costs vary with the proportion of non-
traded goods in total output, and the extent of home-bias in the consumption
of traded goods.
As our model and welfare criteria capture the general policy problem facing
policy makers in economies with non-traded and traded goods sectors, there is
signiﬁcant scope for further work utilising this model in the face of alternative
shocks or alternative descriptions of policy. For example, an examination of
sectoral productivity shocks would be interesting. As would an assessment of
the ability of policy rules speciﬁed in terms of aggregate variables to capture
the desired policy response to shocks in a sectoral economy. One can conjec-
ture that the derivation of the quadratic loss function gives a good guide as to
the appropriate form additional exchange rate terms should enter an extended
Taylor-type policy rule. We leave such analysis for future research.
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Taking a second order expansion of the per-period function Γt gives
Γ = b C − ¯ N1+ϕ[ b N +
1
2
b N2(1 + ϕ)] + tip (143)
With the subsidies in place the linear terms will cancel (see below). It can be
shown that







= b YN − aN +
²t
2
vari{pN(i)} + O[3] (145)
and,







= b YT,H − aT +
²t
2
vari{pT,H(i)} + O[3] (147)
where the price dispersion terms are of second order importance. We can there-
fore write the welfare function as,






















b N2(1 + ϕ)] + tip
The log-linearised combined IRS-resource constraint is given by (which is exact),
b C =( 1− α)γ(b YT,H)+( 1− γ)(b YN)+γb ς − (1 − α)γb φ (149)
From the social planner’s problem we know that with the appropriate subsidies








Which implies,using the focs,
N
1+ϕ
=( 1− αγ) (151)












29and to a second order can be written as,





















































Therefore we can rewrite the combined IRS-resource constraint as,
b C =( 1 − α)γ(aT)+( 1− γ)(aN)+γb ς − (1 − α)γb φ













and can then rewrite welfare as,
Γ = − ¯ N1+ϕ1
2
























From the social planner’s problem we saw that the eﬃcient level of employment
in both sectors was invariant to shocks so that we can rewrite welfare in terms
of eﬃciency gaps, b Xg = b X − b Xe to obtain,
Γ = − ¯ N1+ϕ1
2


























However, it is more conventional to write this in terms of output gaps. From
the eﬃciency solution derived above,
b Y e
N = aN + b Ne (157)
and.
b Y e
T,H = aT + b Ne
T,H (158)
Therefore from the production functions in both sectors these gaps will be pro-
portional to the output gaps, such that welfare can be rewritten as,



















































































































so that we can write out welfare measure as equation (113) in the main text.
31Appendix II - Linking the Relative Price Term
to the Output Gaps.
Log-linearising,
YT,H = γSC∗[(1 − α)ςt + α] (163)
yields,












b T = αb S −
³




b T = α(b YT,H − b φ) −
³
b CN − b CT
´
(167)
Using the deﬁnition of tradeable consumption,










Using IRS/AD condition (55) to eliminate aggregate consumption we obtain,












b T = b YT,H − b YN + αb ς (170)
Using the deﬁnition of eﬃcient variables this can be rewritten in gap form as




     
 




























Figure 5: Optimal Policy with Symmetric and Asymmetric Price Stickiness
across Sectors.
37Figure 6: Welfare Against Proportion of NonTradeables
38Figure 7: Welfare Against Home Bias in Tradeable Goods
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